I am not clear as to what items you object to on the list which Ambassador Stevenson handed to Mr. Thus in the present context their continued presence would sustain the grave tension that has been created, and their removal, in my view, is necessary to a good start on ending the recent crisis.
These bombers could carry nuclear weapons for long distances, and they are clearly not needed, any more than missiles, for purely defensive purposes on the island of Cuba. Thus, in simple logic these are weapons capable of offensive use. It is true, of course, that these bombers are not the most modern of weapons, but they are distinctly capable of offensive use against the United States and other Western Hemispheric countries, and I am sure your own military men would inform you that the continued existence of such bombers in Cuba would require substantial measures of military defense in response by the United States. But I assure you that this matter of IL-28s is not a minor matter for us at all. Your letter says-and I agree-that we should not complicate the situation by minor things. These facts were all known at the time of our exchange of letters on Cuba, and so it seems clear to me that our exchange of letters covers the IL-28s, since your undertaking was to remove the weapons we described as offensive. (2) You will recall that in my letter of October twenty-seventh, I referred to "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use." You will also recall that in my broadcast address of October twenty-second, (3) in addition to medium-range ballistic missiles, I mentioned specifically "jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons," as "an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas." Finally, my proclamation of October twenty-third entitled "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba" (4) specifically listed bomber aircraft.
The solution of the Cuban affair was established by my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of October twenty-eighth. This item is indeed of great importance to us. But there is really only one major item on the list, beyond the missiles and their equipment, and that is the light bombers with their equipment. Our intention was just the opposite: to stick to a well-known list, and not to introduce any new factors. CHAIRMAN: I am surprised that in your letter, which I received yesterday, (1) you suggest that in giving your representative in New York a list of the weapons we consider offensive there was any desire on our part to complicate the situation.
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